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Abstract
We present the choreography enactment pricing game, a cooperative game-theoretic model for the
study of scheduling of jobs using competitor service providers. A choreography (a peer-to-peer service
composition model) needs a set of services to fulfill its jobs requirements. Users must choose, for each
requirement, which service providers will be used to enact the choreography at lowest cost. Due to the
lack of centralization, vendors can form alliances to control the market. We show a novel algorithm
capable of detecting alliances among service providers, based on our study of the bargaining set of this
game.
1 Introduction
Modern distributed systems are usually modeled and described by a service-oriented architecture that is
completely distributed. The ongoing transition from the current service orchestration model for service
composition — where the ensemble of services are composed as an executable business process, controlled
by a single organization (the orchestrator) — to the service choreography composition model [21] — that
describes a non-executable protocol for peer-to-peer interactions among different organizations.
This new model is not only more robust and scalable, but also more collaborative. The popularization
of service choreography model enforces interoperability and loose coupling by reflecting obligations and
constraints among different parties. This trend can be seem as a disruptive change on distributed software
development, creating new opportunities for resource sharing among different organizations.
One of the implications of this trend is that even if a user chooses one service vendor (e.g., a cloud
computing provider) to execute its application, there is nothing that prevents the vendor to subcontract
resources from other vendors and scatter the application services among those vendors, creating a collab-
orative platform composed of resources from different organizations.
Beyond the complexities of the management of composite services (design, provisioning, etc.), we
consider the problem from an economic point of view. Since service vendors are not regulated, both
cooperative and non-cooperative behavior may be expected. This can potentially lead to the formation of
alliances — i.e., the formation of groups of similar independent organizations, who join together to control
prices and/or limit competition.
In this work we use tools and techniques from cooperative game theory [10] in order to analyze the
stability and the alliance formation on this new scenario; a problem we call the choreography enactment
pricing game.
∗This work was supported by projet CAPES-COFECUB MA 828-15 CHOOSING
1
2 Problem statement
In this paper, we study how task assignment between independent service vendors can lead to the estab-
lishment of alliances on unregulated economies. We call organization a vendor, its physical computational
resources and the users subscribed to it.
To state the problem, we will use the standard notation for scheduling on multi-organization plat-
forms [8]. More formally, we have a set of N different organizations. Each organization O(k), 1 ≤ k ≤ N ,
has m(k) machines that can be used to execute jobs submitted by its users or by other organizations.
A user must choose an organization to execute its jobs. The organization will work as a service broker,
choosing which jobs it will execute on its own resources and which jobs will have its execution delegated
to other organizations. The set of all jobs submitted from users of organization O(k) is denoted by J (k).
An organization also have costs associated to the execution of the jobs assigned to its machines. It
is, however, free to schedule these jobs in any way they want, usually to optimize some given objective
(common to all organizations), such as execution cost or global performance. We denote by cost(k)
local
the
cost of the execution of jobs from O(k)’s users when applying the optimal scheduling according to the
organizations’ own objective.
Organizations have the freedom to collaborate, organizing themselves to share their resources, jobs and
to redistribute costs. An organization that choose to not cooperate must execute all jobs from its users on
its own resources, paying cost(k)
local
to do so. A set C of collaborating organizations share all their machines
in order to execute the jobs in set J (C) = ∪k∈CJ
(k). They are free to devise a scheduling that optimize
their own objective using their combined resources. We denote as cost(C) the cost of the optimal schedule.
For the set J (C), the total price that all organizations are ready to pay is given by p(C) =
∑
k∈C cost
(k)
local
.
The payoff of a set of organizations C is given as a function of the price charged by each organization
to their users p(C) =
∑
k∈C cost
(k)
local
. The difference between the sum of the costs that each organization
would have if they were all alone, and the optimal cost achieved when these organizations are collaborating
is known as utility v(C) and is given by:
v(C) = p(C)− cost(C) (1)
Using the terminology of cooperative game theory, v is the characteristic function of the game. Note that
if C is only composed of one organization k, then the utility is equal to zero (v(C) = 0).
We assume that all organizations have the same objective function. Two classical objective functions
found on the literature are:
(
∑
J CJ) [9]: Organizations are locally interested in minimizing the average completion time of their
jobs. If scheduling its jobs in its own resources, the cost to schedule J (k) in O(k)’s own resources is given
by cost(k)
local
=
∑
J∈J (k)
(C
(k)
J ).
(
∑
J EJ) [6]: Each organization O
(k), 1 ≤ k ≤ N , can share several machines that supports continuous
dynamic speed scaling (i.e., processors can operate at any arbitrary speed s that can be changed by the
scheduler over time). A job J ∈ J (k), is defined by its release date r(k)J = 0, its deadline d
(k)
J and its
processing volume 1. The job with the biggest deadline of O(k) is defined as d(k)max = maxi d
(k)
i . Job
preemption is allowed. The energy consumption is given by the integral over time of the power function
P (s(t)) = s(t)α, where s(t) is the speed in which the processor is running on time t and α > 1 is a constant
real number that depends on the technical characteristics of the processor — usually α ∈ [2, 3]. In other
words, an organization O(k) can execute its jobs consuming a total energy of E(k)
local
only using its own
machines.
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Example 1. Consider an instance of (
∑
J EJ) problem. Four organizations want to minimize its energy
consumption. All these organizations have only one machine. Organizations O(1) and O(2) have respectively
19 and 7 jobs. Organizations O(3) and O(4) have 1 job, and all jobs have the same deadline date equals to
1. So, without cooperation, the local cost of organizations is the following :
cost
(1)
local
= 19α, cost
(2)
local
= 7α , and cost
(3)
local
= cost
(4)
local
= 1α.
So each organization O(k) has already to pay cost({k})(= p({k})) to execute all these jobs. Assume that all
four organizations form a alliance. This means that all jobs can be executed in all machines. The optimal
schedule is as follow : 7 jobs are executed on each machine. So, the cost (cost({1,2,3,4})) of the alliance
{1, 2, 3, 4} corresponds to the cost of the schedule of all jobs among all machines: cost({1,2,3,4}) = (4 · 7α).
So the energy consumption savings v({1, 2, 3, 4}) is equal to (19α+7α+2)−4 ·7α. However, organizations
O(3) and O(4) increase this own cost, and now their cost is equal to 7α. So, these organizations should
receive some payment in order their organization to have incentive to take part in the alliance. Now, we
will give some energy consumption savings of different alliances:
v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = (19α + 7α + 2)− 4 · 7α; v({2, 3, 4}) = (7α + 2)− 3 · 3α
v({1, 3, 4}) = (19α + 2)− 3 · 7α; v({3, 4}) = 0
v({2, 4}) = (7α + 1α)− 2 · 4α; v({2, 3}) = (7α + 1α)− 2 · 4α;
Note that alliances {1, 2, 3, 4} and {1, 3, 4} save the same amount of energy.
Let C(k)SH be the global cost of the cooperative schedule SH for organization O
(k). The cooperative
problem can then be stated as follows:
Find (x1, . . . , xN ) such that, for all k (1 ≤ k ≤ N), C
(k)
SH − xi ≤ cost
(k)
local
if such vector exists.
The vector x represents the payment for each organization to have incentive to collaborate.
In this paper, we will focus on games in which binding agreements are possible. Now, we will focus
on the payoffs of each organization, on the way which distributes the value of each coalition among its
members.
3 Cooperative game theory [19]
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair ([N ], v) where [N ] = {1, . . . , N} is a finite set of
players and a characteristic function v : 2|N | → R which associates each subset C ⊆ [N ] to a real number
v(C) (such that v(∅) = 0). Each subset v(C) of [N ] is called a coalition. The function v is a characteristic
function of the game (V, v) and the value of coalition C denoted by v(C) is the value that C could obtain if
they choose to cooperate. In these games, the value of a coalition can be redistributed among its members
in any possible way.
3.1 Revenue sharing mechanism
The challenge of a revenue sharing mechanisms is to find how to split the payoff v(C) among the players
in C while ensuring the stability of the coalition. A vector x = (x1, . . . , x|V |) is said to be a payoff vector
for a k-coalition C1, . . . , Ck if xi ≥ 0 for any i ∈ V and
∑
i∈Cj
xi ≤ v(Cj) for any j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We will focus
on some particular payoff vectors, namely imputations.
Definition 2. A payoff vector x for a k-coalition C1, . . . , Ck is said to be an imputation if it is efficient,
— i.e.,
∑
i∈Cj
xi ≤ v(Cj) for any j ∈ {1, . . . , k} — and if it satisfies the individuality rationality property —
i.e., xi ≥ v({j}) for any player j ∈ [N ].
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The objective is to find a fair distribution of the value of the coalition (the payoff of each player
corresponds to his actual contribution to the coalition) and also to ensure a stable coalition in such a way
that no player or subset of players have incentive to leave the coalition.
The objection Let ([N ], v) be a cooperative game and x a payoff vector of this game. A pair (P, y) is
said to be objection of i against j if:
• P is a subset of [N ] such that i ∈ P and j /∈ P and
• if y is a vector in R[N ] such that y(P) ≤ v(P), for each k ∈ P, yk ≥ xk and yi > xi (agent i strictly
benefits from y, and the other members of P do not do worse in y than in x).
The bargaining set. [3, 17]
A pair (Q, z) is said to be a counter-objection to an objection (P, y) if:
• Q is a subset of [N ] such that j ∈ Q and i /∈ Q and
• if z is a vector in R[N ] such that z(P) ≤ v(P), for each k ∈ Q\P, zk ≥ xk and, for each k ∈ Q ∩ P,
zk ≥ yk (the members of Q which are also members of P get at least the value promised in the
objection).
Let ([N ], v) be a game with a coalition structure. A vector x ∈ R[N ] is stable iff for each objection at
x there is a counter-objection.
Definition 3. The bargaining set B(([N ], v)) of a cooperative game ([N ], v) is the set of stable payoff
vectors that are individually rational, that is, xi ≥ v({i}).
Note that it is sufficient to use the notion of imputations since the payoffs are individually rational.
The bargaining set concept requires objections to be immune to counter-objections, otherwise they are
not considered as credible threats.
Now, we will go back to our problem and try to define appropriate characteristic function that reflects
the outcome expected from coalition formation as described earlier in the problem statement section
(Section 2).
3.2 The choreography enactment pricing game
The choreography enactment game models the cooperative game played by organizations. Their main
objective is to form coalitions in order to schedule all jobs belonging to them having the lowest cost.
We consider particular objective functions for a schedule satisfying the following condition: the cost
(cost([N ])) is the sum of all costs (C(k)SH) of all organizations O
(k). Note that this applies to the objective
functions (
∑
J EJ) and (
∑
J CJ).
Assume that [N ] should form a coalition. Each organization O(k) executes jobs having C(k)SH as a cost.
Its cost can be higher than its local cost cost(k)
local
.
In order to incentive organization O(k) to join a coalition, the cost savings should be redistributed. So,
the characteristic function v of our game corresponds to the cost savings corresponding to Equation (1).
Let x be an imputation. O(k) receives xk as payment. So O(k) has incentive to be in the coalition if
C
(k)
SH − xi ≤ cost
(k)
local
.
Moreover, for the rest of the document, we make two assumptions:
1. The algorithm building the scheduling assure the monotonicity property, i.e, the cost of scheduling
jobs in J usingm machines is less that the cost of scheduling jobs in J usingm′ machines ifm < m′.
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2. The total cost for scheduling among all organizations is the sum of the individual costs of each
organization.
Note that the costs (
∑
J EJ) and (
∑
J CJ) respect these two constraints. Recall that, without the
notion of organizations, they can be solved in polynomial time and respect the monotonicity property.
Also note that the first assumption implies v(C) ≤ v(D) for every pair of subset C,D ⊆ [N ] such that
C ⊆ D.
4 Stable coalitions on the choreography enactment pricing game
This section is devoted to computing the imputation x for the coalition [N ].
Lets focus on organizations that will receive a non-null retribution. Consider the organizations where
participating or not on a coalition does not alter the amount of savings.
Lemma 4. Let [N ] be a set of organizations and v be the characteristic function (corresponding to the
cost savings). Let x be a feasible stable imputation. For each organization O(j) in [N ] such that v([N ]) =
v([N ]\{j}), we have xj = 0.
Proof. Since v respects the monotony constraints: v([N ]) ≥ v([N ]\{j}) for any organization O(j).
First, we consider the case where all organizations O(j) are such that v([N ]) = v([N ]\{j}). It means
that p({j}) = cost([N ]) − cost(−j) for ∀j ∈ [N ]. and the cost for [N ] to execute jobs in J (j) is equals to
the cost for organization O(j) when it executes its own jobs alone. Since v([N ]) = p([N ]) − cost([N ]), we
have v([N ]) = 0 and xj = 0 for ∀j ∈ [N ].
Second, we consider the case where at least an organization O(i) is such that v([N ]) > v([N ]\{i}). Let
O(i
∗) be such an organization.
We prove this lemma by contradiction. Assume that there exists one organization j ∈ [N ] such that
v([N ]) = v([N ]\{j}) and xj > 0.
We prove that xi∗ ≤ v([N ]) − v([N ]\{i∗}). If it is not the case, then organization O(k) ∈ [N ] could
make an objection ([N ]\{i∗}, y) against organization O(i
∗) such that yℓ = xℓ +
xi∗−(v([N ])−v([N ]\{i
∗}))
N−1 for
ℓ ∈ [N ]\{i∗}. Since
∑
ℓ∈[N ]\{i∗}
yℓ = v([N ]\{i}), organization O(i
∗) cannot make a counter-objection against
O(k). This means that x is not a feasible stable imputation, which leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, xi∗ ≤ v([N ])−v([N ]\{i}). Organization O(i
∗) could make an objection ([N ]\{j}, y) against
organization O(j) such that there exists an ε such that xj > ε ≥ 0, y = xi∗ + ε, and yk = xk +
xj−ε
N−2 for
k ∈ [N ]\{j, i∗}. Note that for any k, yk > xk since xj > 0.
Now lets prove by contradiction that organization O(j) cannot make a counter-objection (Q, z). Assume
that organization O(j) can make a counter-objection (Q, z). Let X be a set of organizations such that
X = [N ]\{j, i}. By definition of counter-objection, we have ∀k ∈ Xzk ≥ yk and,
∑
k∈X
zk ≥ v([N ])−(xi+ε).
Since v([N ]\{i∗}) =
∑
k∈Q
zk, we obtain:
zj = v([N ]\{i
∗})−
∑
k∈X
zk ≤ v([N ]\{i
∗})− v([N ]) + (xi∗ + ε)
≤ −xi∗ + (xi∗ + ε) ≤ ε
This contradicts the fact with 0 ≤ ε < xj ≤ zj. Thus x is stable and this conclude the proof.
Now, we focus on participating organizations that does change the amount of savings.
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Lemma 5. Let [N ] be a set of organizations and v be the characteristic function (corresponding to the cost
savings). Let O(i) and O(j) be an organization such that v([N ]) > v([N ]\{i}) and v([N ]) > v([N ]\{j}).
Let O = [N ]\{j} be a subset of organizations.
Let (O, y) be an objection of O(i) against O(j). In order to have a counter-objection to (Q, z), with
Q = [N ]\{i} of O(j) against O(i), a sufficient condition is:
xj − xi ≤ p({j}) − p({i})− cost
(−i) + cost(−j) (2)
Proof. Assume that there is an objection (O, y) of organization O(i) against organization O(j). By defini-
tion of objection, we have that ∀k ∈ O, yk ≥ xk and yi > xi. Recall that v(O) = p(O)− cost(O).
Let X be a set of organizations such that X = [N ]\{i, j}.
Now, we will look for a counter-objection of organization O(j) using (Q, z), where, for each k ∈ Q\O,
zk ≥ xk and for each k ∈ [N ]\{i, j}, zk ≥ yk. W.l.o.g, we can assume that Q = X∪{j} and k ∈ X, zk = yk,
otherwise, we can build another counter-objection Q′ such that k ∈ X, z′k = yk and z
′
j = zj+
∑
k∈X(z
′
k−zk).
By combining the definition of characteristic function v, we obtain:
v(Q)− v(O) = (p(Q) − cost(Q))− (p(O)− cost(O))
By definition of function p, the previous equation can be rewritten
v(Q) − v(O) = p({j}) − p({i}) + cost(O) − cost(Q) (3)
Since v(O) =
∑
k∈X yk + yi and v(Q) =
∑
k∈X zk + zj , Equation (3) can be rewritten as:∑
k∈Q
zk −
∑
k∈O
yk = p({j}) − p({i}) + cost
(O) − cost(Q) (4)
Since
∑
k∈Q
zk −
∑
k∈O
yk = zj − yi +
∑
k∈X
(yk − zk), it is sufficient that:
zj − yi ≤ p({j}) − p({i}) − cost
(Q) + cost(O) (5)
We can notice that cost(O) = cost(−j) and cost(Q) = cost(−i). From the definition of objection, it is
sufficient to have:
xj − xi ≤ p({j}) − p({i}) − cost
(−i) + cost(−j).
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Lets focus on organizations that will receive non-null retribution, i.e., organizations on the coalition
that does have impact on the amount of cost savings.
Theorem 6. Let [N ] be a set of organizations and v be the characteristic function (corresponding to the
cost savings). Let A be a subset of organizations {j ∈ [N ] : v([N ]) > v([N ]\{j})}. There exists a unique
stable imputation x if x fulfills all the three following conditions:
1. ∀j ∈ [N ]\A, xj = 0
2. ∀j ∈ A, xj = cost
(−j) + p({j}) − 1|A| ·
(
cost(A) +
∑
k∈A cost
(−k)
)
; and,
3. ∀j ∈ A, cost(−j) + p({j}) ≥ 1|A| ·
(
cost(A) +
∑
k∈A cost
(−k)
)
.
Proof. Property (1) can be straightforward deduced from Lemma 4.
The bargaining set is the set of all imputations that do not admit a justified objection. So, if we apply
Lemma 5 to i, j and then to j, i, we can derive that for any couple (i, j) ∈ [N ]2, we have
xj − xi = p({j}) − p({i}) − cost
(−i) + cost(−j).
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Let O(j) be an organization in A. Summing the previous equations, we obtain:
∑
k∈A
xi − |A|xj =
(∑
k∈A
p({k}) + cost(−k) − |A|(cost(−j) + p({j}))
)
(6)
From the properties of the value of the coalition and by computation, we can rewrite Equation (6) as:
∀j ∈ A, xj = cost
(−j) + p({j}) −
1
|A|
·
(
cost(A) +
∑
k∈A
cost(−k)
)
(7)
Property (3) can be deduced from the fact that xj ≥ 0 and from Equation (7).
Now, we apply Theorem 6 to Example 1. Assume that organizations O(2) and O(4) form an alliance
([N ] = {2, 4}). Thus cost(−2) = 1α and cost(−4) = 7α. We obtain x2 = x4 = 12(7
α + 1α)− 4α. This means
that in this alliance organization O(4) pays p({4}). From the alliance, it receive two payments. The first
payment is due to the cost executing tasks assigned to it from other organizations in the alliance, and the
second corresponds to the reward x4 for taking part in it. In any case, the imputation represents either a
reduction in the costs of overloaded organizations (in this example, organization O(2)) or is a payment for
the use of these resources by another organization (in this example, organization O(4)).
Now we will establish the relation between the price and the different costs when there is a stable
imputation. Using Theorem 6, we will compute the lower bound for non-empty bargaining sets.
Corollary 7. Let [N ] be a set of organizations and v be the characteristic function v (corresponding to the
cost savings). Let A be a subset of organizations {j ∈ [N ] : v([N ]) > v([N ]\{j})}. There exists a unique
stable imputation x if p(A) ≥ cost(A).
Proof. From Theorem 6, we have:
∀j ∈ A, cost(−j) + p({j}) ≥ 1|A| ·
(
cost(A) +
∑
k∈A cost
(−k)
)
.
By summing these |A| inequations, we have:∑
k∈A
(
cost(−j) + p({j}
)
≥ cost(A) +
∑
k∈A
cost(−k).
The previous inequation can then be rewritten as: p(A) ≥ cost(A).
These results constitutes the mathematical framework needed to devise an algorithm that, given a set
of organizations [N ], determines whether an alliance is possible and, if possible, computes the imputation.
Corollary 8. Let [N ] be a set of organizations with their sets of jobs. If all organizations have as objective
function (
∑
J CJ) or (
∑
J EJ), then Algorithm 1 determines in polynomial time whether [N ] can form a
coalition and, if possible, returns the imputation vector.
Proof. These objective functions respect the monotonicity property and an scheduling minimizing these
objectives can be devise in polynomial time (see [2] for a polynomial algorithm for (
∑
J EJ)). Therefore,
we can apply Theorem 6 and Corollary 7, which are implemented by Algorithm 1.
Note that the same result straightforwardly applies to any scheduling problem whose objective function
respects the two assumptions described in Section 3.2), as long as they can be solved in polynomial time.
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Algorithm 1: Coalition detection algorithm.
Input: A set [N ] of organizations, function v (corresponding to the cost savings), and cost(.).
Output: (Whether there is a alliance or not and the imputation vector)
1 Compute the lowest cost schedule SH;
2 forall the organizations O(o) ∈ [N ] do
3 Compute the lowest cost schedule using only its own resources and its local cost(
cost(o)
local
= p({o})
)
;
4 Compute the lowest cost schedule using all resources except O(o)’s resources and its cost(
cost(−o)
)
;
5 Compute the lowest cost schedule using all the resources and its cost (cost([N ]));
6 forall the organizations O(o) ∈ [N ] do
7 Compute p([N ]\{o})
(
=
∑
j∈[N ],j 6=o p({j})
)
;
8 Compute v([N ]\{o})
(
= p([N ]\{o})− cost(−o)
)
;
9 Compute A = {j ∈ [N ] | v([N ]) > v([N ]\{j})}, p(A), cost(A) and
∑
k∈A
cost(−k);
10 if p(A) < cost(A) then
11 return (coalition=false, imputation=∅)
12 forall the organization O(o) ∈ A do
13 compute xo according to Equation (2) of Theorem 6;
14 return (coalition=true, imputation=x)
5 Related work
The problem of scheduling jobs on independent, selfish organizations sharing a common infrastructure —
known as the Multi Organization Scheduling Problem or MOSP— was first studied by Pascual et al. [12,20]
and was then extended to include notions from game-theory by Cohen et al. [7,8]. The original studies does
not include the ability to form coalitions; MOSP only allows rebalancing the jobs between organizations,
as long as no organization presents a performance degradation according to their its own performance
objective.
The choreography enactment pricing game is similar to fair resource allocation and networking games.
Fragnelli et al. [13] studied a related cooperative game that they called the shortest path games. Their
game models agents willing to transport a good through a network from a source to a destination. Using
a graph model, and letting agents to control the nodes, they have studied how profits should be allocated
according to the core of the cooperation.
Maintaining the assumption of s-veto players, Voorneveld and Grahn [22] extended the shortest path
game and proved that the core allocations coincide with the payoff vectors in the strong Nash equilibria
of the associated non-cooperative shortest path game.
Several subsequent papers [5, 18] studied computability and complexity aspects of this game. Some
properties of graphs and games guaranteeing the existence of a core have been proposed and the com-
putability complexity of computing cores have been established (NP-complete and #P-complete). Other
variants (different payoffs and players controlling arcs) have been considered, but mostly focusing on the
existence and complexity of cores, whereas this work mostly focus on the construction of the bargaining
set in polynomial time.
The flow game can be view as maximum multicommodity flow problem in a cooperative setting. This
model can be used to identify the set of demands to satisfy and to route this demand on the network.
In this context, players own network resources and share a capacity to deliver commodities. Kalai et
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al. [14] first considered flow games for network with a single commodity, where a unique player owns an
arc. Several studies (for example, [1, 11, 16]) extended this seminal work. Those extensions encompass
variations on the number of arcs a player can control, if the player controls all or a part of the capacity of
the arc, if players control vertices, etc. Those papers mainly focus on how to obtain the optimal flow in
the network and then on how to allocate the revenue using core allocation techniques (since those games
have non-empty cores).
6 Conclusion
This work presents a game-theoretic model for the problem we call the choreography enactment pricing
problem. Service providers must enact, i.e., assign all jobs that composes the users’ applications (service
compositions) to resources of its own or subcontract resources from other service providers. Each organi-
zation must pay a price to execute the jobs from its users. This price depends on a given cost function
that is common to all organizations (e.g., energy costs). In order to reduce its costs, a set of organizations
can form alliances (coalitions) to share its resources and reduce its costs.
From an economic point of view, the lack of regulations may create alliances that can control the prices
and/or limit competition. Our study of the choreography enactment pricing problem as a cooperative
game characterized the mathematical conditions needed for the creation of stable coalitions. From this
characterization we devised an algorithm to detect if such alliances can be formed.
The study of the bargaining set of this problem suggests that this problem may be related to the notion
of truthful mechanism from algorithmic mechanism design in game theory. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no study about this relation and it would be an interesting future work.
Also as future work, we will consider this problem with a broader set of cost functions (such as the
total makespan). For now, our results cannot be apply cost functions that does not respect monotony
constraints. One of the first step is to consider the load as the cost (i.e. the sum of all jobs executed in the
same organization). Recently, Azar [4] designed a polynomial randomized 2-approximation algorithm for
minimizing makespan using restricted-related machines. They use technique to find an optimal fractional
solution [15] and they modify optimal fractional solution that the load assigned to machine is monotone.
Using this result and from the expectation linearity, all our results can be applied. It means that to find
an imputation x such that, for all k (1 ≤ k ≤ N), E[C(k)SH] − xi ≤ E[cost
(k)
local
] if such vector exists can
be computed in polynomial time. This technique can may be help to solve for the formation of coalition
considering makespan as the cost.
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